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In a widely reviewed recent book, Phillip Augur group managing director of 
Schroeder’s has called investment bankers ‘greed merchants’ and argued that the 
integrated investment banking model is inherently flawed since it seeks “an ireconcilable 
reconciliation between a plethora of inbuilt conflicts of interest”. (2005, p10).1 
 
These conflicts of interests arise from the role of the investment bank as advisor 
to both buyer and seller in a single financial transaction. Augur argues also that this 
combination of execution and advice functions creates immense market power enabling 
investment banks to manipulate the market to serve their own interests. In the post 
Surbene-Oxley world regulatory measures have not been developed to address these 
basic flaws of the integrated investment banking model. 
 
In capital market operations the same investment bank advises the issuer and arranges 
distribution of stock through its brokerage subsidiaries. Investment banks thus have the 
potential to effectively run a new issues cartel. This capability leads to an unjustifiable 
increase in the cost of new issues—surely a matter which ought to be of serious concern 
in Pakistan, where new issues have been scarce. Investment banks have also been 
accused of encouraging take over and merger activity as a means for increasing their own 
profits. It has been SBP policy under Ishrat Hussain to encourage financial sector 
concentration of assets but there is no evidence that this has yielded any benefit to the 
smaller investor or deposit holder in Pakistan (Meenai and Ansari 2004. Chap 11). 
 
Analysts of deals in mature financial markets have often complained of rip offs in fund 
management transactions and of exorbitantly high profits charged by investment banks 
on structured derivatives. 
 
Many analysts (for example Bodie and Merton 2001) have accused investment banks of 
lacking an ethical framework. This amounts to the charge that the allocation of 
investment funds as mediated through investment banks does not lead to an optimally 
efficient utilization of society’s total resources—i.e to a maximization of aggregate profit 
/ well being.1 However, achieving an optimum allocation of financial resources is in the 
long run interest of the investment banks 2 themselves. It is therefore rational for 
investment banks to use their considerable regenerative and innovative capabilities for 
identifying synergies between their strategies for profit maximization and strategies 
crafted by national policy makers for realizing the full economic potential of Pakistan. 
Authors such as Augur believe that the function of originator and distributor of funds 
must be separated—investment banks must not be allowed to own brokerage 
subsidiaries—if this is to be achieved. 
 
                                                 
** Paper Presented at a conference on Investment Banking organized by the College of 
Management Sciences PAF-KIET and Business Solutions in July 2005 at Karachi. 
Taking account of national objectives in developing corporate strategies is supposed to 
have gone out of fashion. Are we not living in the era of globalized capitalism where the 
nation state is supposed to be withering away and national policy is becoming a matter of 
accepting the wishes of the dominant players in world financial and commodities markets 
and accepting the dominance of regulatory regimes designed by the international 
bureaucrats of the WTO, the IMF, the BIS and the EU. 
 
 
The overwhelming rejection by the French and Dutch electorate of the European 
constitution has exposed the fictitious character of this myth. The continuing victories of 
the mujahideen in Iraq and Afghanistan and America’s inability to create stable client 
regimes in these countries also illustrates the continuing salience of national power. 
Liberal democratic order –global or national -- cannot be produced or sustained anywhere 
in the Muslim and as Fareed Zakaria foresaw (2003) free and fair elections will produce 
anti imperialist Islamic governments from Morocco to Indonesia—as they have done in 
Iran in 2005 through the triumph of the Ulema of Islam. Globalization is an American 
project in the specific sense that ultimately it is American coercive force and American 
coercive force alone, which guarantees the dominance of global market and state 
governance processes. But America is a power in decline—its share of global GDP 
measured in purchasing power parity terms has fallen from over 50 percent at the end of 
the Second World War to less than 22 percent today. (WDR 2005 Appendix Tables). 
During the previous decade America’s trend rate of growth has been half that of China 
and American factor productivity growth has stagnated. The bourgeoning budget and 
current account deficits and a rapidly aging populations are making global hegemonic 
projects—such as seeking regime change in Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba and 
Zimbabwe—increasingly unviable. American client states in Europe and North Asia are 
facing serious economic stagnation and decline and are in no position to bolster 
American global hegemony.  
 
Global financial order is also threatened by intensifying rivalry between America and 
China. The Chinese Communist Party remains in effective control of the Chinese 
economy and society and the American ‘split China’ strategy, initiated in the Thiamin 
riots of 1989 has collapsed.3   China has shown how protection of domestic markets and 
industries can be maintained while formal compliance with the global liberal regulatory 
regime is instituted. America has failed to dismantle the Chinese foreign exchange 
regime and its momentory policy. By imposing quotas on textiles America has initiated a 
trade war against China.4 which threatens to escalate. If the Communist Party has to 
remain in command China has no option but to challenge American systemic hegemony 
and its associated global public order. 
 
It is therefore unwise for investment bankers to ignore national interests and to accept 
American hegemony and the dominance of global market players as natural and eternal. 
In 2005 global financial order faces several serious threats. Growth rates have been 
scaled down in every major capitalist country. Unemployment has risen Asset 
distributional inequity is reaching un-precedentedly high levels and stagflation is re-
emerging as a serious policy concern. 
 
Furthermore, the expectation that self regulation can replace state regulation as a modus 
vivendi for ensuring financial market stability is being questioned. Alan Greenspan has 
warned that rapid growth of credit derivatives has created considerate uncertainty about 
how financial markets may react to economic shocks (FT 6/5/2005). The complexity of 
derivates transactions and the monopolization of financial markets has made risk 
assessment more and more difficult for both regulators and participants. This is 
paradoxical since derivates are supposed to spread risk among multiple investors and thus 
increase the resilience of the banking system. The woeful inadequacy of the existing 
international regulatory regime to prevent or mitigate crises has been emphasized by 
Greenspan who has frequently acknowledged that the Federal Reserve simply does not 
know the size of the global financial market, the degree of leverage of key players within 
it or the balance of risk sharing between investors. The regulatory regime cannot address 
risk management issues raised by the explosive growth of the collateralized debt 
obligation (CDO) industry. The US regulatory regime measures CDO transactions in 
terms of their book value and not their risk but a 2005 Morgan Stanley study has shown 
that during 2003-2004 the book value of CDO transactions represented only about 40 
percent of their risk adjusted value Greenspan warns that “understanding the credit risk 
profile of CDO tranches poses challenges to even the most sophisticated market 
participant” (FT 6/5/2005). CDOs are seen as having created a false sense of security 
among investors. They have the potential to act as mechanisms for crisis transmission—
investment banks, insurance companies, hedge funds and pension funds have large CDO 
holdings—and the regulatory regime is not equipped to deal with such a situation. This is 
becoming an increasingly important concern as interest rates rise in the mature capitalist 
economies and tighter monetory policy is used to deal with the impending threat of 
stagflation. 5               
 
CDO growth since the mid 1990s has been fuelled by the erosion of margins in many of 
the traditional avenues of investment bank operations—such as bond underwriting—and 
the search for higher yields. Higher yield requirements have led investment banks to 
create ever more complex products whose risk profile cannot easily be assessed and the 
dizzying rate of product innovation since 2002 complicates regulation and risk 
assessment enormously. Instances of sponsor seller deception have occurred. Thus in 
February 2005 Barclays Capital ‘(an investment bank) had to accept an out of court 
settlement with a German regional bank which claimed that Barclays had miss sold CDO 
tranches Bank of America faces similar charges from an Italian bank (FT 17/4/5). Similar 
cases of deception are likely to become more common and the  riskiest CDO tranches are 
carried by investment banks and hedge funds. 
 
The proliferation of hedge funds is another source of worry. They are highly opaque, 
highly leveraged and have the potential to rush out of the market at a moment’s notice. 
Greenspan sees them “as subject to considerable funding pressure” in 2005 (FT 8/5/5) 
and increasingly risky. Once again this is paradoxical for hedge funds are supposed to 
hedge against risk and to correct stock market distortions. The opacity of their operations 
arises from “their fiduciary obligation to investors. If a short position became public this 
could undermine the reason for making it “says a leading hedge fund CEO. (Moley 
2005): This necessary transactional secretiveness has created market jitters over their 
potential exposure as returns have fallen from conventional strategies such as convertible 
arbitrages in 2004 and 2005. An increase in the riskeness of hedge funds investment 
portfolio is a major worry for they regularly account from a quarter to a third of equity 
traded in the New York Stock Exchange.  Since 2002 hedge funds have become one of 
the biggest and most profitable customers for investment banks. No effective regulatory 
mechanism exists to ensure that hedge funds do not take on “excessive” risk and 
exposure. American and global regulators expect investment banks to ensure that hedge 
fund risk exposure is not excessive. Concern with lapses on hedge funds regulation date 
from the collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998. Huge hedge fund 
losses have been recorded in the US, Germany, The Netherlands and Singapore in 2005. 
 
Hedge funds have been accused of “short termism” and transactional opacity. In 2005 
many hedge funds suffered losses because they were taking huge risks by buying risky 
CDO tranches and selling short less risky ones and buying corporate debt while selling 
the equity of the same company short. These trading strategies were seriously hurt earlier 
this year when Standard and Poor downgraded GM and Ford stock to junk status. This 
shows that many hedge funds do not adopt strategies for correcting market distortions. 
Quite the contrary they are momentum traders –“herders” following market trends 
creating mini bubbles and accentuating market distortions. 
 
Enhanced riskinesss of financial markets has been an unintended consequence of the 
growth of instruments such as CDOs and hedge funds specifically designed to diversify 
risk. This illustrates that capitalist markets cannot regulate themselves—that belief in the 
optimality of corporate self regulation is belief in not only a false but also a dangerous 
myth. This realization has induced even countries such as South Korea, which want to 
become a regional financial hub to tighten up the foreign investment regulatory regime. 
In April 2005 seven American private equity funds were being investigate for alleged tax 
fraud. New policy guidelines have been developed to regulate take over and mergers in 
South Korea. More stringent requirements for disclosure of source of funds by foreign 
investors have been enacted and tighter control of portfolio investment is also envisaged 
(FT 7/5/2005). 
 
As global credit markets tighten, global equity markets brace for interest rate shocks, 
metropolitan country growth rates plummet (as recently forecast by such leading analysts 
as Merrill Lynch, Jordine Fleming, Goldman Sachs, the IMF and the OECD) conflict 
between China and the US intensifies and America prepares for abandoning its allies in 
Asia, investment banks need to turn inwards and take national interests seriously. All 
banks are by definition public institutions—share holder’s equity is of necessity a small 
fraction of total capital employed. The banks are custodians of the public’s money and as 
financial markets segmentation is eroded this is as true of investment as it is of 
commercial banks. Investment bank strategy should not merely be focused on 
maximizing share holders value. It should seek to address issues concerning the impact of 
financial sector profit maximization strategies on the structural transformation of the 
national economy. 
 
In other words we must explicitly reject the view that appropriate macro structural 
transformation is an inevitable, unintended consequence of micro level financial sector 
profit maximization strategies. There is overwhelming empirical evidence which shows 
that this is not the case.6 Market strategy must explicitly take account of national 
structural weaknesses and national economic interests. 
Perhaps the most important structural weakness of the national economy is the 
investment strike which has continued even in the high growth years of FY 2003 to FY 
2005. As the Economic Survey (2005) shows both total investment and fixed investment 
declined as a ratio of GDP in 2004-2005. Public investment as a ratio of GDP has fallen 
significantly and private sector investment has stagnated paradoxically despite the 
phenomenal growth of private sector credit and the sporadic capital market surges. The 
domestic savings performance is so abysmal that it does not rate a mention in the 
executive summary of the 2005 survey released to the press. 
 
Pakistan is experiencing consumption fuelled growth and the bourgeoning trade deficit 
indicates increased import dependence of both consumption and investment growth. We 
are seriously under-investing in capital goods sectors and several UNIDO studies (2003, 
2004) have shown that Pakistan’s technological competitiveness has been declining in 
global markets. In terms of technological capability. Pakistan ranked 79th out of 118 
countries in 2000—more than 30 ranks below India (UNIDO 2004). The growth that we 
have been experiencing is detechnologizing growth. 
 
It is also immiserising growth : while per capita income exceeds $ 730 according to 
government estimates the majority of labor market participants have a monthly wage of 
less than Rs 4000 and average family size is still six. This means that Pakistan has one of 
the world’s most unequal patterns of income and asset distribution. The rapid growth of 
the financial sector means nothing to the bulk of the population. The vast majority of the 
people have no contact with the formal money and capital markets. Pakistan is among the 
few countries in the world where the bank branch to population ratio has declined during 
the past two decades. During 1985-2005 population has almost doubled but the number 
of bank branches has fallen by almost twenty percent (Meenai and Ansari 2004, Chap 
11). Similarly while advance accounts in excess of Rs. 10 million account for less than 
0.4 percent of the total number of advance accounts at scheduled banks in Pakistan 
almost 70 percent of total bank advances are extended to them (Meenai and Ansari 2004, 
Table 11.1). Our banks—commercial, investment and NBFCs are apparently not 
interested in creating investment products targeting the common man. 7 
 
If the increased profitability of the investment banks is to serve as a vehicle for 
strengthening the national development effort and stimulating desired structural 
transformation investment bank strategy must focus on the following issues. 
 
• Developing risk management instruments and institutional frameworks for 
insulating the national financial sector from adverse global market shocks and 
increasing its resilience. The banks must develop a capacity to assess the political 
risks of exclusive reliance on American support. The State Bank’s unreserved and 
unqualified commitment to subordinating Pakistan’s financial structure to global 
markets must be abandoned “Learn from Beijing” must be our motto in this 
regard for China has shown how subordination can be avoided while benefiting 
from global opportunities. Unless national resilience to global financial shocks is 
augmented we may become victims of the type of financial Tsunami that was 
imposed upon South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia in 1997 and 1998. 
 
• Secondly asset management and portfolio management strategies have to be 
crafted to reduce the volatility of the capital market. Reducing “short termism” 
lengthening the time profile of investment planning periods and promoting 
structural linkages between physical and financial investment must be major 
investment bank strategic concerns. The collapse of the DFIs has decimated 
project financing. All major infrastructure projects in Pakistan are imperialist 
funded. This exacerbates our global subordination and makes the pursuit of 
national economic policy objectives more and more difficult. Investment banks 
should seek to revitalize investor interest at the long end of the market. Both 
China and Iran have shown how ambitious project financing can be undertaken 
without subordination of national development priorities to global capital. 
Investment banks should therefore play a pivotal role in promoting joint ventures 
with China and Iran. 8                       
 
• Thirdly the business strategy of the investment banks must address the issue of 
exacerbation of asset distributional inequalities. Two major initiatives are required 
in this context. On the one hand a range of investment products must be 
developed for the small real sector investor—the shopkeeper, the repair and 
maintenance business; the small producer of agricultural tools and equipment, the 
school owner in the peri urban centers. The micro enterprise financing schemes 
have all but collapsed because they do not address the question of increasing the 
productivity of the small manufacturer and businessman. Neither micro banks nor 
mutual funds can address this issue. Investment banks must develop financial 
products which promote linkages between large and small enterprises. Such 
production distributional and technological linkage has played a major role in 
enhancing the productivity of China’s Town and Village Enterprises and in 
reducing unit costs for the country’s major exporting firms (UNIDO 2001). 
 
• Finally investment banks must pay close attention to ethical management. 
Building trust is the key to successful long term profit maximization by financial 
institutions: Ethical management systems have been institutionalized by many 
leading financial institutions in global markets9  These systems structure 
organizational practices to ensure that ethical risks and opportunities created by 
specific transactions are identified. They develop a framework for promoting 
ethical consciousness and ethical behavior by employees and they create 
structures for involving key strategic stakeholders (specially customers and 
regulators) in assessment of organizational performance. An effective ethical 
management system can demonstrate how an investment bank is taking account 
of the social and developmental impact of its business strategy. It can show that 
the investment bank is concerned to articulate a business strategy which is 
beneficial for society as a while. 
 
We have argued that investment banks are social institutions. They are custodians and 
trustees of the public’s money and promoting national interests—strengthening the 
sovereignty of our state, technological upgradation and reduction of asset distrubutional  
inequities—must be explicit objectives of their business strategy. These objectives will 
not be unintentionally, automatically achieved by profit maximazation. A strategy has to 
be crafted which deliberately synthesis   financial viability and profitability concerns with 
the concern for safeguarding national sovereignty and promoting national development.  
NOTES 
1. In capitalist order the maximization of profit and social well being are seen to 
be the same thing (Ansari, Naeem and Zubairi 2005 Chap 2) 
2. As it is in the interest of all other forms of capatilist property (Nayyar 2003) 
3. The split India’ strategy—launched by America through the ongoing Kashmir 
initiative—is however likely to be more successful. 
4. America’s client states in the European Union will also do so in the near 
future. 
5. This is specially the case in the euro region. 
6. Summarized for example in Stiglitz (2203) Chap 3 and 6 
7. As against this consumer financing products targeting lower middle income 
groups have proliferated during Ishrat Hussain’s governership. Banks are thus 
serving as a conduit for transferring savings from the poor to the rich and thus 
accentuating asset distributional inequalities. 
8. On the other hand India is not a suitable partner both for geo strategic reasons 
(reflected in Indian obstinacy on dam projects in Occupied Kashmir) and 
because global capital dominates major project financing deals in India. 
9. These have been described in detail in Roussouw (2004) Chap 15. 
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